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I. INTRODUCTION
The approach of the Supreme Court in interpreting statutory lan-
guage was a stagnant issue until the appointment of Justice Antonin
Scalia by Ronald Reagan in 1986. Since then, the Supreme Court's
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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accepted approach to statutory interpretation has been placed under a
microscope. Once Justice Scalia's nomination was approved, he initi-
ated a campaign to purge the Supreme Court of its reliance on non-
textual sources to aid in the interpretation of statutory language.
One of the primary thrusts of this battle has centered on the use of
legislative history.' The Supreme Court has used legislative history as
a tool of interpretation for nearly a century.2 Ideally, after the pur-
pose of the statute is ascertained, the Court applies its understanding
to reach a compatible result with what Congress intended when the
statute was enacted. Courts have used legislative history and other
extrinsic material to ascertain the purpose of the statute and the Con-
gressional intent. Courts seldom follow this ideal approach. Justice
Scalia objects to the use of legislative history because he believes that
extrinsic material actually replaces the statutory language. Justice
Scalia advocates the use of extrinsic material to determine only the
context in which the statute was enacted.
A one sentence statement of this position is that the text which
Congress passed into law is the text which the Court must restrict
itself to using.3 The decisionmaker's task is to ascertain the meaning
of the words in the text to interpret Congressional purpose. When the
extrinsic material replaces the decisionmaker role in ascertaining in-
tent, the judge's role is undermined. Therefore, if the meaning that is
derived from the text is ambiguous or would result in an absurd con-
struction, then the decisionmaker may look to non-textual sources to
interpret the statute.4
The purpose of this comment is to present and evaluate Justice
Scalia's main objections to the use of legislative history. The founda-
tions for the textualist school of thought will be briefly discussed, fol-
lowed by an overview of Justice Scalia's arguments for rejecting
legislative history. The second section of the article will focus on the
common criticisms of Justice Scalia's approach and why the use of leg-
islative history should continue, albeit with certain limitations in
place. Finally, the article considers why Justice Scalia is motivated to
abandon legislative history in his theory of statutory construction.
1. The types of legislative history with which Scalia is most concerned and which
are included under this umbrella term include Congressional floor debates, com-
mittee reports, hearing testimony, and presidential messages.
2. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwA L. REv. 195, 196-97 (1983).
3. Patricia L. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM.
U. L. REv. 277, 281-82 (1990).
4. This is basically a statement of the "plain meaning rule." In Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917), the court stated that when the language does not
lead to an absurd result, there is no need for judicial construction.
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II. A TEXTUALIST ON THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Textualist Approach
According to the textualist theory, the only authoritative source
for interpreting statutes is the text of the statute.5 The interpretive
role of the Court is to ascertain and effectuate the intentions of Con-
gress as they are expressed when legislation is passed. The textualists
believe that legislative history is a rival text created by a group other
than the voting legislature. The legislative history has no authority
and is not intended to determine statutory meaning.6
The backbone of the textualist approach to statutory construction
is the "plain meaning rule." The modern standard for the rule is that
when the statute is plain on its face, there is no need to consult extrin-
sic material to ascertain legislative intent.7 Justice Scalia promotes
himself as a strict advocate of this principle. Most recently, however,
the Court has placed minimal significance on the plain meaning rule
in statutory construction. Instead, the Court uses legislative history as
an integral part of its approach to statutory construction.
It may be helpful to draw a comparison to a pyramid. At the apex
of the pyramid, we find that there is no reliance on legislative history.
At the next lower level, where minimum reliance is used, legislative
history confirms an interpretation of the "plain meaning" of the statu-
tory language. Intermediate reliance, approximately at the middle of
the pyramid, is the use of legislative history without clarifying
whether the text of the statute is ambiguous. The base of the pyramid
represents replacement of the text of the statute with the legislative
history.8
One of Scalia's converts in his campaign to limit the use of legisla-
tive history is Justice Anthony Kennedy.9 Justice Kennedy recently
noted one of the concerns textualists have when non-textual resources
are consulted. Kennedy stated, "[r]eluctance to working with the ba-
sic meaning of words in a normal manner undermines the legal pro-
cess ... [and] leads instead to woolly judicial construction that mars
the plain face of legislative enactments."o
5. See Wald, supra note 3, at 282.
6. William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique,
66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991).
7. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
8. See Wald, supra note 3, at 282, 285. (This represents using the legislative history
to replace the statute's language as authoritative. In other words, it compels a
finding that the information in the legislative history is definitive on the question
of the statute's construction.)
9. Justice Kennedy was appointed to the Court in 1988 by Ronald Reagan.
10. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 469-70 (1989)(Kennedy,
J., concurring). (Kennedy uses the term "woolly" rather facetiously because the
majority opinion referred to the verb "utilized" as a woolly verb. This is why the
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Justice Scalia has taken the Court to task on a number of occasions
for its half-hearted attempts to adhere to the plain meaning rule.
These attempts were so half-hearted in the early 1980s that one com-
mentator identified the 1981 term as tolling the death knell of the
plain meaning rule." During this term, Court watchers observed a
definite trend of Justices using legislative history as a backstop to con-
firm their interpretation of the text of statutes.12 This approach, la-
belled the "hybrid" approach, is evident when judicial opinions
enunciate their interpretation of the statute, stating the statute is
plain on its face, but then refer to the relevant legislative history to
further support their interpretation.13
B. Justice Scalia's Objections to the Use of Legislative History
Scalia defines specific guidelines to follow when interpreting stat-
utes. These guidelines allow for the consideration of three sources.
Primarily, of course, Justice Scalia accepts the plain meaning of the
statutory text at issue. Second, a judge can view the structure of the
statute or the "four corners" of the document as a whole to gain an
insight into the meaning of the language.14 Finally, other related pro-
visions of enacted statutes may be considered by comparing wording
and the meaning attached to those words.15
By defining the methods which Justice Scalia accepts in his theory,
we can easily identify what sources are not acceptable to him. The
primary objections Justice Scalia relies on in his campaign against the
use of legislative history can be categorized into two themes. These
themes are constitutional objections and practical objections.
1. Constitutional Objections to Legislative History
Article I of the U.S. Constitution requires that: "Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
court was inspired to begin its exploration of the legislative history of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. Id at 452).
11. See Wald, supra note 2, at 197-198.
12. Id. (This 'qhybrid" approach is also the equivalent of the minimum level of reli-
ance which I placed near the top of the pyramid.)
13. See Wald, supra note 3, at 289. (The author noted cases from the 1988-89 term
where the Court referred to legislative history to confirm its reading of statutory
language. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,175-182 (1989), the
Court considered whether section 1981 was limited to the protection of the right
to make contracts and the right to enforce contracts. The Court held that the
provision only protected situations within these two distinct categories and
briefly surveyed proposals by various Congressmen.)
14. Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 530-37
(1989). Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 815-17 (1989).
15. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring).
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States; If he approves he shall sign it ... ,"16 Justice Scalia argues that
the constitutional requirements of Article I are not complied with
when legislative history is used as a tool of statutory construction.
The two elements Justice Scalia extracts from Article I to support
his argument are the concepts of bicameralism and presentment to the
President. Since the word "bicameral" indicates a two-house form of
government, bicameralism in this context is the concurrence by both
houses of Congress to activities where there must be two-house assent.
The lack of concurrence by both houses to legislative history created
without two-house approval is a violation of bicameralism. Justice
Scalia argues that the formal legislative process must be followed
before the material can become authoritative.17
The presentment element of Article I is met by presidential signa-
ture on a piece of legislation which has been approved by both houses
of Congress. Justice Scalia theorizes that the President is signing a
bill the language of which is limited to what is contained in the bill.
The Court, then, is bound by Article I to interpret only text which
complies with the bicameralism and presentment doctrines.
Justice Scalia argues that assent among the branches of Congress
and between Congress and the President is the only reasonable way to
comply with the Article I requirements. The bicameralism and pre-
sentment doctrines together make up the formal legislative process
adopted by the Constitution. These parties have only given their as-
sent to the text of the statute, not the extrinsic material floating
around Capitol Hill.
There is a definite consistency in Justice Scalia's adherence to the
constitutional objectives of bicameralism and presentment. Prior to
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia declared the im-
portance of these two concepts. In 1983, he joined with the American
Bar Association to urge the Court to affirm a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision. In INS v. Chadha,18 the Ninth Circuit struck down a
Congressional veto provision in immigration deportation cases. Spe-
cifically, the issue dealt with the ability of the Attorney General and
Congress to mandate deportation of individuals. Under agency rules,
the Attorney General was able to suspend deportation recommenda-
tions made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
However, section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act' 9
reserved the right for the Senate or the House of Representatives to
unilaterally veto the Attorney General's suspension and mandate that
deportation be carried out. The Court expressly stated that Congress
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
17. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)(Scalia reiterating these constitu-
tional objections in concurring opinion).
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19. Formerly located at U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2).
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may make law only by bicameral action and presentment to the Presi-
dent.20 In this case, section 244(c)(2) was declared unconstitutional as
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.2 '
Justice Scalia's position on the use of legislative history predicts his
rejection of the legislative veto. The only authoritative voice of Con-
gress is the voice of the legislation it enacts. Although the legislative
veto is "a useful 'political invention' "22, it is clear that Congress may
not interfere with Executive branch decisions.
In an administrative law context, the decision of the majority in
Czadha is an early 1980s indication of the new emphasis on the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. Like the majority who joined in that decision,
Justice Scalia is a staunch supporter of a clear-cut application of the
separation of powers doctrine. C7adha also warns that administrative
separation of powers issues will be reviewed on a more narrow basis.
Because of Justice Scalia's participation under the umbrella of the
ABA, this is an early indicator of Scalia's emphasis on strict adherence
to constitutional divisions of power.
2. Practical Objections to the Use of Legislative History
The first practical objection is the ease with which staff or mem-
bers of Congress can manipulate the content of legislative history. In
theory, manipulation of content facilitates a favorable interpretation
by courts and enforcement agencies. The second practical objection is
the inconsistency which arises or the "margin of error" which results
when legislative history is used to interpret statutes.2 3 The result is
that a judge may engage in judicial activism and ignore the principle of
judicial restraint.
a. Staff Involvement and Poisoning the Process
The staff of committees and members of Congress play a role
which places them in a sensitive position with considerable discretion.
Justice Scalia's objections emphasize the difficulty of staff oversight.
Although an elected official presumably is the approved spokesperson
for his or her constituents, the same cannot be said for the staff of a
Congressional committee or a member's staff assistant. The responsi-
bility of drafting the reports which make up part of legislative history
is overwhelming. So overwhelming that the staffers cannot be trusted
to accurately report the purpose and scope of specific legislation.24
20. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-959 (1983).
21. Id at 959.
22. Id. at 945.
23. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Fed-
eral Statutes, 32 Wis & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991).
24. David A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent & Public Choice, 74vA.
L. REv. 423, 438-46 (1988).
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One of the textualist's primary fears is the susceptibility of com-
mittee reports to a "stacking of the deck" in order to promote a
favorable interpretation from a judge.25 The staff of the members of
Congress are the links to the Political Action Committees (PACs), the
constituents, and the administrative agency personnel. With these
ties, it is easy for a staffer to encourage their favorite member of Con-
gress to purposely include favorable statements in public addresses or
to ensure these statements are written into the committee report.
Justice Scalia believes that these inputs poison the legislative process.
b. Erroneous Interpretations Allow for Activism
The second practical barrier which textualists identify as grounds
for ignoring legislative history is the threat of inconsistency. This in-
consistency is an invitation for judicial activism. Unrestricted use of
legislative history allows a judge to sift through various material and
reach result-oriented decisions.26
A commonly cited analogy first announced by Judge Leventhal
and commonly used by Scalia is that: "Mhe intelligent use of legisla-
tive history is like walking into a crowded cocktail party and looking
over the heads of the guests to pick out your friends .... "27 It is not
difficult to comprehend the meaning of this remark by Judge
Leventhal. With selective use of committee testimony, statements,
and reports, any stray remark or "snippet" may be used as authorita-
tive evidence of Congressional intent.
The textualists fear that "snippets" of legislative history will be
used without regard to the context in which the remarks were made.28
In In re Sinclair, Judge Easterbrook29 observed that the improper use
of legislative history is difficult to avoid. Therefore, judges should re-
strict their references to legislative history as much as possible.30 By
minimizing the use of legislative history, it is concluded that judicial
25. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). Judge Easterbrook wrote that
he objected to the use of committee reports because it was "loser's history" ("If
you can't get your proposal into the bill, at least write the legislative history to
make it look as if you'd prevailed"). Id
26. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: To-
ward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,1309-
10 (1990).
27. Id. at 1310 n.58.
28. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). This case analyzed whether a
statute or legislative history should prevail when there is conflict between the
enacted statutory text and the extrinsic evidence. Easterbrook determined that
the enacted statutory text prevails over the legislative history in all cases.
29. Easterbrook also embraces the textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). See
also Zeppos, supra note 26.
30. Id.
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choice will be eliminated.3 '
Minimizing the types of sources available to decisionmakers is not
an attractive option for the intentionalists. The majority in Public Cit-
izen v. Department of Justice wrote that all material available to as-
certain intent should be utilized.32 In Public Citizen, the Court faced
the issue of whether the American Bar Association was an "advisory
committee" as defined in the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA).33 The plaintiffs argued that the ABA was an advisory com-
mittee and was therefore required to disclose information regarding
the nominations for positions on the federal bench.34
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, held that the
word "utilized" in the FACA language was ambiguous and thus, the
Court was forced to look to legislative history to ascertain Congres-
sional intent.3 5 In its exploration, the Court delved into all related
material to determine whether the FACA applied to the ABA.36 The
majority expansively used extrinsic material in this case to over-
shadow the question of whether the disclosure requirement was a vio-
31. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1337.
32. 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989).
33. 5 U.S.C. App. § 1-12. Section 3(2) of the FACA defines advisory committee as:
"(2) The term 'advisory committee' means any committee, board,
commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar
group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof...
which is-
(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest
of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies of officers of the Federal Government .... "
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452 (quoting FACA).
34. Id. at 447-48.
35. I& at 452-55.
36. I& at 455-467. Justice Kennedy noted that the obvious place for the majority to
look to find the purpose of the FACA was under the section of the Conference
Committee Report entitled. "Findings and Purposes." IM at 475-76. The section
lists six findings and purposes of the FACA:
"(1) the need for many existing advisory committees has not been
adequately reviewed; (2) new advisory committees should be established
only when they are determined to be essential and their number should
be kept to the minimum necessary; (3) advisory committees should be
terminated when they are no longer carrying out the purposes for which
they were established; (4) standards and uniform procedures should gov-
ern the establishment operation, administration, and duration of advi-
sory committees; (5) the Congress and the public should be kept
informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities,
and cost of advisory committees; and (6) the function of advisory com-
mittees should be advisory only, and that all matters under their consid-
eration should be determined, in accordance with law, by the official,
agency, or officer involved."
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972).
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lation of the Appointments Clause.37 The majority intended to
construct the statute to avoid raising a question of constitutionality.38
Justice Scalia, who did not participate in the case, would argue that
the majority needlessly relied on legislative history to avoid the consti-
tutional question. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but for
different reasons. He refused to look at the legislative history, but in-
stead analyzed the case on constitutional grounds. Justice Kennedy
concluded that since the purpose of the committee was to aid the Pres-
ident in the nominating process and appointment process, the FACA
infringed on the President's appointment power. 39
Mindful of Justice Kennedy's opinion on the Court's use of legisla-
tive history, the Court will avoid a constitutional analysis of a provi-
sion as long as the result is not plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress. 40 While it is highly debatable whether or not placing the
ABA committee under the provisions of the FACA is plainly contrary
to Congressional intent, the majority made a questionable statement
when it said, "we are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press
ahead... in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those per-
ils."41 It is absurd to say that Congress intentionally enacts legislation
it believes to be unconstitutional. Certain provisions of an enactment,
though unconstitutional, do not subvert the legislation in its entirety.
3. The Revised Standard for Interpretation
Justice Scalia has recently attempted to define his own standard
and theory of statutory interpretation. In Blanchard v.Bergeron,42
Justice Scalia ventured into new territory by declaring that he favored
developing "an interpretation of the statute that is reasonable, consis-
tent, and faithful to its apparent purpose .... "43 Unfortunately, Jus-
tice Scalia did not elucidate as to what he meant by "reasonable" and
"apparent."44 Obviously, the interpretation must not be apparent
from a reading of the legislative history. Instead, Justice Scalia envi-
sions that judges should exercise a high degree of discretion to fix the
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989). ("[Where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.")(quoting Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988)). The FACA is one of the only oversight tools for advisory
committees.
39. Id at 469.
40. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1943).
41. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
42. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
43. Id. at 100.
44. See Wald, supra note 3, at 305.
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application of legislation. As Justice Cardozo put it, "Statutes do not
cease to be law because the power to fix their meaning in case of doubt
or ambiguity has been confided to the courts."45
II. THE OTHER SIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE VALUE OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
This section discusses the popular responses to the objections made
by Justice Scalia. These responses are illustrated in judicial opinions,
by legal commentators, and by members of Congress. Because this de-
bate is a productive one, the proposals set out below are intended to
guide the judiciary in future clashes on the need to refer to extrinsic
material to aid in interpretation. If realistic parameters are estab-
lished, the use of extrinsic materials will enhance the working rela-
tionship between Congress and the judicial system.
A. Critique of Arguments
The failure to comply with the legislative process is one of the jus-
tifications for Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history. However,
this argument should be a concern only if the legislative history actu-
ally replaces the statute.46 Definitely, legislative history should not be
the real starting point in statutory construction. However, when legis-
lative history is used only as evidence of purpose, the constitutional
protections of bicameralism and presentment are less important.
Thus, judges should ensure that the particular constitutional require-
ments are complied with when legislative history is consulted.
Justice Scalia believes that the most unreliable type of legislative
history is a committee report.4 7 Contrary to that view, arguably the
most unreliable types of legislative history are individual statements
of Congressmen. The statements of the sponsor of legislation are the
least reliable if we accept the idea that the Article I requirements
must be complied with. Statements by sponsors should be used with
caution because, as of the time these statements are made, there will
have been no compliance with the legislative process. This is particu-
larly true when a legislator is first introducing the legislation. At that
point, there is no clear indication the legislation has any support.
Justice Scalia also opposes individual statements of Congressmen
because of the chance of manipulation by members. This problem,
however, is not as serious as the failure to comply with the legislative
process. Common sense tells us that bill sponsors and supporters will
always take action to garner support for their ideas. Responsible op-
ponents must oppose or reject amendments while these proposals are
45. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, TnE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 127 (1921).
46. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring).
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being debated. Similarly, misleading and inappropriate remarks in
legislative history need to be clarified. Judges who use legislative his-
tory have a responsibility to determine if contradictory legislative his-
tory exists. Likewise, judges who oppose the use of legislative history
have opportunities to "impeach" legislative history by finding contra-
dictions in various extrinsic material. This method may be very effec-
tive if Justice Scalia wishes to prove his point that legislative history
often is contradictory. At this point, he has yet to do so.
The second Article I objection Justice Scalia makes is when legisla-
tive history is consulted without input by the President through the
presentment doctrine. This objection lacks the observation that the
executive branch does play a role in the legislative process at the com-
mittee level. That is the role of the Executive or administrative
agency in drafting legislation and lobbying Congress. The executive
branch has an on-going role in drafting and reviewing materials gener-
ated in the enacting process.48 For instance, in Bankamerica Corp. v.
United States,49 the Court cited testimony from committee hearings
given by Louis D. Brandeis, who was an advisor to President Wilson at
the time the Clayton Act was enacted.50 This is one example of the
Court lending credibility to an executive branch statement which did
not comply with the bicameral requirement.
1. Courts Already Approach Certain Legislative History with
Caution.
Scalia argues that the temptation to use legislative history should
be avoided because of the tendency to manufacture statements for
favorable interpretations. As previously discussed, this is a valid fear
in the early part of the legislative process because there has been no
debate or agreement.
Indeed, courts have recognized that statements from individual
legislators are unreliable. In Hadden v. Bowen, 51 the court deter-
mined that a House committee report was more reliable than state-
ments made by individuals. The individual statements were
contradicted by the final committee report attached to the legislation.
Therefore, the court in Hadden created a hierarchy of authority for
the extrinsic material that was consulted.52 By keeping in mind this
48. See Zeppos, supra note 25, at 1312.
49. 462 U.S. 122 (1983).
50. Id at 134-35.
51. 657 F. Supp. 679 (D. Utah 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir.
1988).
52. The House Committee Report is a better indication of the legislative intent than
are statements made by individual Congressmen, senators, or the President.
Where the views expressed in the committee report conflict with such state-
ments, the report controls. Id at 684-85.
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hierarchy, a type of judicial oversight evolves. This oversight will
avoid misapplication of Congressional intent.
The courts construing statutes have now been forewarned that a
bill introduced into committee for the first time or remarks made dur-
ing testimony have been untouched by the legislative process. As the
bill passes through the legislative process of committee comment,
however, sufficient exposure to the'safeguards of notice and comment
have been initiated and a broad compliance with the legislative process
occurs.
Justice Scalia, unfortunately, does not view the committee process
as a practical equivalent to the formal procedures of Article J.53 The
committee report has come under attack from Scalia because of the
role of committee staff in sifting through evidence to prepare the re-
ports. Notice that Scalia's objections to statements by individual legis-
lators and to committee reports are substantially similar.
This argument ignores two important aspects of the committee sys-
tem: increased professionalism of committee personnel and the role of
executive departments in lobbying members of Congress. Agencies
have substantial opportunity to submit information to Congressional
committees and, in fact, are required to do so in certain circum-
stances.5 4 As legislation is exposed to the legislative process, oppo-
nents will have the opportunity to create their own record in the
legislative history. Language will be inserted and deleted in the bill
itself and committee staff will know what the intended scope of the
legislation is through oral testimony and written reports. After the
staff sifts through this information, the substantive aspects of the leg-
islative process have been complied with.
2. The Textualist Approach Increases the Margin of Error in
Interpretation
The textualist approach to statutory interpretation tolerates a cer-
tain degree of inconsistency and error by maintaining loyalty to the
plain statutory language.55 This practice places more importance on
following canons of construction and denies the need to identify with
Congressional intent. An example of such a case was United States v.
Locke.56 In this case, the Court interpreted the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976.57 At issue was the timeframe in which
holders of mining claims on federal lands were obliged to register
their claims with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The statu-
tory language provided that the claimants must file claims "prior to
53. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring).
54. ARTHUR M AAS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983).
55. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1314.
56. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
57. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982).
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December 31."58
The plaintiffs in Locke filed their claim on December 31. The
Court, noting that the deadline language was unambiguous, held that
the plaintiffs forfeited their million-dollar claim. The dissenters ar-
gued that the plaintiffs should not be required to relinquish the claim
for two reasons. First, the BLM had deviated from the statute and
approved a regulation which required filing on or before December 31.
Second, the BLM accepted registrations which were received in the
office prior to January 19 of the following year.
An intentionalist view of this case would have looked to the BLM's
own administration of the 1976 Act. Noting the inequities which
would result if the claimants were obliged to forfeit, the intentionalist
view espoused in the dissent placed authoritative control on the
BLM's procedures. These procedures used a flexible approach to the
December 30 deadline. However, the majority, led by Justice Mar-
shall and Chief Justice Burger, denied the plaintiffs the benefit of the
agency approach. The opinion was sadly deficient in the analysis of
why a strict application of the deadline was necessary. It is also note-
worthy that the Court did not rebuke the BLM for promulgating a
regulation inconsistent with the statutory authority.
The majority of courts do accept the idea that legislative history
may be used to show that statutory language may be modified because
of clear Congressional intent.59 The Locke case exemplifies the
problems encountered by a textualist who ignores clear, unequivocal
evidence of contrary Congressional intent. The Locke case was a
prime candidate for a deciding court to avoid literal application of the
statute's text. It is hardly credible that Congress chose the second to
last day of the year rather than the last day of the year for a filing
deadline.60
B. Justice Scalia's Failure to Propose Workable Solutions.
The assault on the use of legislative history in interpretation has
made inroads in persuading decisionmakers to guard against unlimited
use of extrinsic material. However, Scalia's analysis of the role of leg-
islative history in statutory interpretation lacks one fundamental ele-
ment: proposing a reasonable alternative. Apart from the statement
found in Blanchard v. Bergeron relating to "reasonable and appar-
ent,"61 Justice Scalia has failed to propose a method to deal with the
issue. Is it necessary to propose a new test? It is necessary because
Justice Scalia cannot expect to persuade the judiciary to convert to a
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a)(1982).
59. Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988).
60. Id See also Wald, supra note 3.
61. See Wald, supra note 3.
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strict textualist approach, one which has never been followed. In-
stead, Justice Scalia needs to acknowledge that extrinsic material will
be utilized and enunciate a test which allows for its use.
Currently, Justice Scalia will only refer to extrinsic material when
the language is ambiguous and would lead to an absurd result. It ap-
pears that before one may look to legislative history, the deci-
sionmaker must scrutinize similar language contained in other federal
statutory provisions. One need not have a very active imagination to
determine the effects of this type of activity if its use became common.
Resorting to statutory language in other code provisions raises a con-
cern because there are no limitations on its use. These considerations
do not stop Scalia from using other code provisions to resolve ambigu-
ity or doubt, however.
In Lukhzrd v. Reed,62 the Court was faced with the issue of
whether the income qualifications of Aid For Dependent Children
(AFDC) should include personal injury awards as part of the counta-
ble income of a recipient. Scalia, who wrote for the majority, reviewed
one statute dealing with a public welfare program and the tax code to
see if those enactments had directly faced the issue. In the Internal
Revenue Code and in the provisions governing the Food Stamps pro-
gram, the text specifically provided that personal injury awards were
not considered "income." The Court stated that since these two exam-
ples expressly indicated that awards were not income, by virtue of
AFDC's silence, the personal injury award should be counted as
income.
Why do committee reports written contemporaneously with the
legislation present problems for textualists but the use of other code
provisions to interpret statutory language do not? The same objec-
tions to the use of legislative history can be used to reject reference to
other code provisions. Is it any more likely to resolve meaning with
any more certainty by looking at other statutory language, especially
when the language is not even within the same code provision?
Common sense tells us that code provisions should not be authori-
tative either. They were not created contemporaneously with the stat-
ute at issue and there is no unequivocal intent to modify statutory
language. The personnel involved in enacting the legislation will be
different and will emphasize different aspects of the legislation.
These are precisely some of the justifications a federal court deci-
sion proffered in refusing to accept retroactive legislative history.6 3 In
1984, Congress attempted to create legislative history which would ap-
ply to the 1976 Copyright Act provision governing the right to a jury
62. 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
63. Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1987).
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trial when statutory damages are sought.6 4 The majority of courts had
denied the right because there was only reference to the word "court"
and "in its discretion" in the language codified at 17 U.S.C. section
504(c).65 In 1984, Congress enacted legislation titled, "The Semi-Con-
ducter Chip Act" (SCPA).66 This was an entirely new act which dealt
with copyright law. Since Congress was working with a new technol-
ogy, they chose to deal with the problems in new legislation rather
than through amendment to the 1976 Act. The SCPA did not depart
from the language of the 1976 provision. While the legislative history
of the 1976 Act was silent, this time the House Judiciary Committee
purposely inserted language in the SCPA committee report which
stated that it was Congress' understanding that the legislation pro-
tected the jury trial right, just as the right was protected in 1976.67
Congress did this because circuit courts were split on the issue of
whether a jury trial was available when statutory damages were
sought.
One court expressly rejected this attempt to force retroactive in-
tent on the judiciary. In Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman,68 a
Seventh Circuit district court rejected the legislative history of the
House of Representatives relating to the SCPA. This attempt to deal
with the jury trial issue through the back door indicates that Congress
failed to fully consider the ramifications of their actions. This is espe-
cially true when we consider that Congress amended the 1976 Act in
1988, even though courts continued to deny the jury trial right. Con-
gress knew that this was a problem but refused to affirmatively deal
with it.
The Lukhard case raises some of the same problems as those raised
by the analysis of the SCPA. For example, the legislative body enact-
ing the provisions was not the same. Therefore, the language was not
drafted contemporaneously with the legislative history. In the SCPA
example, there was an unequivocal statement that the 1984 provision
should apply retroactively to the 1976 Copyright Act. This raises the
question of whose or what intent do we look at?
One can refer to presidential statements,69 individual legislators'
statements, committee reports, or post-enactment legislative history.
64. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMME, N2ER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.01 (1992).
65. It is curious and interesting to note that the circuit split on the jury issue may be
due to the fact that "court" and "discretion" are words which have accepted
meanings in judicial practice. This fact may be beyond the thinking of the aver-
age member of Congress. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S.Ct.
1138, 1146 (1991) for a discussion on issues which arise when words have clearly
accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 900 (1984).
67. See NIMMER, supra note 64, at § 14.01.
68. 670 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1987).
69. See Popkin, supra note 6.
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The intentionalists conceivably would accept it all. This may raise
problems of information overload, and certainly, the more sources re-
ferred to, the more chance of finding contradictory intent.
Justice Scalia has dealt with these problems by looking for a
"unanimous" intent. Since there will never be unanimity, the closest
we can get is narrowing the sources to a statutory enactment which
formally complies with Article I. However, in our legal system, we
have determined that "collective" intent is one important fiction
which will be perpetuated.70 Textualists believe that there is no legis-
lative intent, there is simply statutory purpose.
If the textualists mean that there is no intent because Congress
failed to consider the "un-provided" for case-they are correct. "The
reason why difficult cases of statutory interpretation arise is because
Congress has not provided a clear answer."71 The intent that the deci-
sionmaker is looking for is what Congress would have done had they
considered the question.
There are cases when the decisionmaker does not want to make
that judgment. If the statute is vague or if the question is charged
with politics, the Court may avoid a decision by doing one of two
things. The Court may "remand" or the Court may simply take an
activist view and create judicial law.
The strategy of remanding is used predominantly by the Supreme
Court to force Congress to clearly express their intent in legislative
enactments.72 In some situations, the Court may have a very good idea
of what Congress intended by looking at the legislative history. How-
ever, since Congress did not clearly express that intent in words, the
Court will refuse to use the legislative history. When Justice Scalia
can garner enough votes to ignore the implied intent, the Court will
force Congress to draft more explicit statements of their intent.
This remanding occurred frequently after Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. One specific example was General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert 73 where the Court denied women the right to claim dis-
parate treatment because of pregnancy. The Court took this approach
despite the presence of legislative history which directly addressed
that issue. Later, in 1978, the 95th Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act to protect pregnant women from discriminatory
treatment.74
The other side of the coin occurs when the statutory language is
vague and the Court decides the issue by exploring legislative history
to justify the holding. In any of these types of cases, one would think
70. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1341-42, 1344.
71. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1321.
72. See Mashaw, supra note 23.
73. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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that we may see more blocked-out provisions because of "void for
vagueness." This occurred in Blanchard v. Bergeron, and, in fact, may
be an alternative for textualists who promote dearer, more expressive
language. This may kill two birds with one stone because, as at least
one commentator has noted, vague statutory language does lead to
more litigation.75
IV. SCALIA'S MOTIVATION FOR IGNITING THE DEBATE
Justice Scalia is rejecting a century of the Supreme Court's use of
legislative history. The Court, while paying lip-service to the plain
meaning rule, routinely analyzes legislative history to construe a stat-
ute in accordance with Congressional intent. Is this really all that is
behind Scalia's vigorous dissents and concurrences? Is his purpose
merely to get the Court "back on track"? There are two points of view
pertaining to these questions. Justice Scalia is either simply promot-
ing the textualist view or he sees this as a way to support his own
political agenda.
Throughout Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, one finds the theme of a
strict interpretation of separation of powers. Any breach of the lines
between the three branches of government is a violation of the doc-
trine. Indeed, "the interpreter... must above all things put aside his
estimate of political and legislative values, and must endeavor to as-
certain in a purely objective spirit what ordering of the social life of
the community comports best with the aim of the law in question in
the circumstances before him."76
This passage communicates the idea that one branch of govern-
ment may not force upon another its own standards of propriety. One
of Scalia's objections is the effect on the separation of powers doctrine
when legislative history is used. By references to legislative history, is
the Court's role as the interpreter of legislation undermined? When
legislative history is used as the "real rule" rather than as merely evi-
dence, it is not frivolous to argue that the Court's role is undermined
at the expense of bolstering Congress.
The light should go on in everyone's head when we review the na-
ture of the President's involvement in nominations to the Court. An
increasingly conservative court can be just as great a barrier to the
will of Congress as a President who has veto power.77 For Scalia, pro-
moting a strict textualist view may result in the enhancement of the
executive branch rather than making the branches co-equal. The
United States has seen an increasingly liberal Congress at odds with a
conservative Executive. With a new administration, however, the
75. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 404 (1985).
76. CARDozo, supra note 45, at 90.
77. See Mashaw, supra note 23, at 832.
[Vol. 72:568
1993] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION TECHNIQUES 585
Supreme Court appears to be ready to move into more liberal
jurisprudence.
The textualist view is a clever way for a conservative Court to de-
crease the impact of "liberal statutes."7 8 Why is this true if the textu-
alist view is the most accurate interpretive approach? Principally
because the textualist approach is just another pliable tool for deci-
sionmakers who wish to make their own value judgments and avoid
strict adherence to Congressional purpose.
Although most commentators do not want to label Justice Scalia as
a judge with such an obvious political agenda, there is no reason not to.
The use of legislative history can be subdued to the extent that statu-
tory language is the "real rule" and the first resort. Further, as illus-
trated by the Hadden decision, a hierarchy of reliable legislative
history is already evolving. Finally, when intentionalists are "im-
peached" by contradictory legislative history, the most accurate statu-
tory purpose will unfailingly emerge.
78. Id. at 834.
